The Conflicts of the Obsessional Neurotic
A Lacanian Dream-Interpretation1
1. The construction
The basis of the following dream-interpretation are two hypotheses of the psychoanalytic theory respectively premises of the psychoanalytic practice. Firstly: In states of anxiety, in contrast to states of fear, not the (single) object, but the real is encountered. Anxiety is on the one hand never totally objectless, as Lacan says in his seminary "L`Angoisse", but on the other hand one doesn't know which object is meant.2 Secondly: The speechless, sometimes panic anxiety of the socalled obsessional neurotic is not to conceive primarily as a fear of death, but as a fear of life, that means as a fear of the real insofar this real is our biological life. This life can, however, be conceived as a life less everything what constitutes a person not so much as a speaking existence, but rather as a linguistic being.
So, for those who act in speech (le parole) it seems to be difficult to exclude the dimension of life, as Lacan wrote in "Encore"3, while those who are fixed in the language (la langue) want to cheat life in favor of death. As the obsessional neurotic: To flee from the anxiety of life, he implants his speech into language, relinquishes his lively message to a fossilizing code so that his desire is oriented at enjoying death. On the one side the anxiety of life here corresponds to a wish for death and on the other side the lively existence of the discourse is in contrast to the essence of the institution.
But this institution appears to be not only the language - because the language is an abstract institution. Also those concrete institutions are worth to be considered here, where language is only used instead of being (re-)created by its subject. This is on the one hand of course the institution of the university which, although a discourse, is an institution in itself. This can be seen on its graph: Above left the knowledge (S2) is situated, supported or supposed by the pure significant (S1) as far as it is at the place of truth. And from here it interpellates, calls upon, produces, works out the surplus pleasure (a), that necessarily leads to the production of the subject ($), which, in this case (because this is the essence of the institution), makes its relationship to truth impossible.
But on the other hand also the institution of psychoanalysis may be considered here, because the psychoanalytic discourse can always become an institution, namely, as I want to show later, through a regress. This can also be seen on its graph: Above left is the small a, the surplus pleasure, supported or supposed by S2, the knowledge, as far as it is at the place of truth. And from here it interpellates the subject ($), that necessarily leads to the production of S1, the significant, through which its relationship to truth may, but must not be solved (because the institution prevents this).
Now, the obsessional neurotic arranges himself in both institutions, once they are set for him. They let his anxiety of life disappear and nurture his wish for death. Through this nurturing, however, they make its fulfilment impossible. For this sort of nurturing too, as every nurturing, comes from the ditmension of life, because in every language - at the university in the language of teachers and pupils and in psychoanalysis in the language of analysts and patients - speech, i.e. speaking and enjoying speaking is the last telos and the drive to speak is the beginning of all.
Just this way constitutes itself the paradox of the obsessional neurotic: not to know whether he is alive or dead4 - alive in his speech or dead in language, but perhaps already dead in his speech and still alive in language. And out of this develops a second, a reflexive desire, that makes enjoying impossible: the desire to leave behind the institution, all institutions and so to pull out of the cycle of all discourses (that all became institutions), of the progress into the analytic and of the regress into the unversitary discourse5. This proves to be the crisis of every analysis of an obsessional neurotic and at the same time - if it cannot be overcome - its end.
2. The dream
The basis of my construction of the constitutive conflicts of the obsessional neurotic are some dreams, communicated to me during an analysis over several years. Here I present only one of them, verbatim and in full length:
In the main lecture hall of the university (*Auditorium Maximum6): There are an immense number of listeners present and I don't know a single one of them. In front at the desk professor M.P., my thesis supervisor (*Doktorvater; i.e "doctor-father"). He scarcely tells one or two of his philosophically difficult but at the same time simple sentences into the eerie silence of the assembled auditorium, as immediately a storm of enthusiasm breaks out. One of the listeners holds a laudation, another one goes to the front and shakes the hands of my supervisor (*Doktorvater). He wants to continue his lecture, but the jubilation takes no end. Finally, he thanks the listeners and distributes leaflets to everybody: Some of them are invitations to him home, another part contains textmaterial to his lecture. I ask myself, why he not simply just continues his lecture and leave the hall disappointed. After arriving home, I call K.D. and H.M. Though actually I didn`t want to see them anymore, I invite them to me for a working group. There are also other participants, but I don`t know them. We talk about the sentences we heard in the lecture. I am annoyed, but I don`t know why; and after a short time I feel solely disappointment and rage. I struggle for words, I want to make myself understandable, but I don`t manage it. Finally, I stand up of my place and address everyone personally. I approach H.M. and shout at him with wild gestures: "You huge baby, you traitor!" And I shout at K.D.: "You are an old hypocrite, a weakling!" Both react indifferently to my words, as if they already knew what I think about them. Finally I say to all: "Sorry, but now I have to announce my leaving (*Abgang) from university; we shall never meet again." Little by little everybody disappears, I don`t see them anymore, but an unknown woman who is at least a head smaller than me, not very pretty, already somewhat elder, wants something of me, I don`t know what. For that we have to return from the door back into the flat; she walks beside me. Suddenly I realize, that she only wants to wrap me around her little finger, she wants to butter me up. So I shout: "Leave my flat, disappear, go!" and I wake up.
3. The center
I can`t consider here all elements of this dream in detail7. Particularly, I have to renounce to illuminate his whole personal background that would allow to make clear those passages that cover the concrete relationships of the dreamer to the persons mentioned in the dream. But these questions are not all too important for the overview I want to give here. I can rather take up the constructive elements of the first part of this paper to make the central conflicts clear:
In obsessional neurosis in general it is, on the one hand, the thinking, that becomes the object of phantasies, but, on the other hand, it becomes itself the object of thinking, in particular in form of a collecting and prescribing, so to speak "pedantic" thinking. Thus it becomes the object of a thinking, that assumes the thinking it thinks mostly to be a center of knowledge, which it has to go through and scrutinize - in the regredient search for knowledge. And this movement of going through and scrutinizing at the place of the knowable, of what is to be known and is already known not only by others but also by the Other, we came to know as that part-movement of the universitary discourse that Lacan wrote up for us as follows: The agent of knowledge (S2) supported or supposed by the meaningless signifier at the place of truth (S1) calls upon the knowing Other as its surplus pleasure (a).
But on the other side this movement, that begins philosophically as thinking of thinking and ends scientifically as knowledge of knowledge, is searching at the same time progrediently for his own desire and, to the extent as it is itself desire, for the desire of desire. But this second desire, the desire it is searching for, to the extent as it is knowledge, is for itself again only a desire in reified form, a comprehensible desire, one to be comprehended and possibly already comprehended by others and also by the Other, so actually a non-desire. And as this desire of non-desire, which is also a desire - namely the desired truth - it is that part-movement of the universitary discourse that Lacan wrote up for us as follows: The product of the desiring subject ($) puts the desired truth of the meaningless signifier (S1) as the pillar of knowledge (S2) to silence.
As we can see this very discourse, namely as a universitary discourse in literal sense, is the center of the just cited dream too. To be sure it is a center in two respects: first everything in it revolves - in the sense of an attraction of the universitary discourse - around the significant "*Doktorvater / doctor-father" (see especially the first part of the dream), but second - in the sense of a repulsion of this discourse - around the significant "*Abgang / leaving" (see especially the second part of the dream). This means, that the ambivalence of love and hatred (hainamoration in Lacanian terms8), which is so much typical for the obsessional neurosis, finds its expression in this dream insofar, as the loved object - affected at the same time by an unbridled hatred - becomes actually the cause of a reflectorical exceeding of the obsession itself.
4. The identification
I concentrate first to the attractive center of the obsessional neurosis: As a "doctor-father" the professor is mentioned in the dream first only as an authority outside the family, but as a "doctor-father" as an inner-family authority; and both functions of the professor, that actually appear in the dream (see the opposition "at home" resp. "home" and "auditorium maximum" resp. "lecture") are, however, exceeded and underpinned by a third function, the structural (i.e. the structuring and structured) function of God. This turned out in the course of the analysis by a day-residue which contained the key to the opposition formulated in the dream between both the "difficult" and "simple" sentences of the professor.
The day before the dream he read in a monography of Gilbert K. Chesterton about Thomas of Aquin the following short anecdote: "A lady I knew found incidentally a book of St. Thomas provided with a commentary and she began to read full of hope a passage with the innocent title "About the simplicity of God". After a short while she put the book aside with a sigh and said: If this was his simplicity I would like to know what his complexity is.'"
It became clear that in his dream he performed a dissolvance, a condensation between the complexity and simplicity of God on the one side and the difficult and simple utterances of his "doctor-father" on the other, that means he identified - unconsciously - the one with the other. Thereby the significant chain "doctor-father-God" presented itself at first as the center of his discourse, and in addition it presented the formula giving rise to this chain as a formula for a specific mixture, that of the identification of the other with the Other: "The other", as in-sists here the significant chain at the ex-sistent place of the unconscious, "is the Other".
But secondly (another association revealed that, we can`t consider here) he supposed / subordinated himself too to this chain as a subject-passing-through and, in the sense of creating an ideal, moved himself into the center of his discourse. Only on the background of this second identification was it to explain why in every situation of hatred again and again he staged not only the symbolic leaving of the other but also of his own. For he had turned over the formula of Rimbaud, communicated to us by Lacan: "Not only Me, which I am searching for, is another, but another is Me too."
5. The wish for death
As far as the "leaving", that means, the repulsive center of the obsessional neurosis of the patient was concerned, another day-residue led onto its track and to its more precise interpretation. He told me: "In the evening before my dream I met friends, a couple. As his wife asked my friend about the quality of the wine we were just drinking, he answered: the wine is a Chianti Classico anyhow, but a little bit weak in its "*Abgang"9. I still remember that this words provoked me to an answer; and as it was already late and my friend had announced shortly before his intention to go to sleep soon, I said somewhat ironically: Well, so it is: as closer you yourself are to the "leaving" , as weaker it seems to you with the wine.'"
"*Den Abgang machen", "to kick the bucket" means therefore, following the logic of this day-residue, to go to sleep, according to some mythological images (where the sleep is considered as a brother of death), means to get similar to death, respectively the dead. An interpretation, which in my opinion may claim validity even if one answers with Lacan to Catherine Millots question "Is the desire for death to situate on the side of the desire for sleep or on the side of the desire for waking up?" as follows: "Owing to the symbolic, the total waking up is death - for the body. Deep sleep makes it possible that the body continues to exist." And: "What Freud imagined by the socalled "death instinct" implies that the waking up of the body is the destruction of itself. Because in contrast to the pleasure principle he qualifies it as the hereafter: this hereafter, that is the opposite."10
"To kick the bucket", the wish to get similar to death means on the background of this interpretation first: the wish to wake up. And because it is just the organic body, the biological life, that is occupied by anxiety (as seen in the first part of this paper); and because it is not death itself which causes anxiety, but the biological moment of death, the moment of dying, the wish for death (that means the wish not to be able to die) means here also to wish, that the body shouldn`t continue to exist, that means that it shoudn`t be. Insofar the death which is meant by the imaginary wish for death is the real death (the great death), and insofar the obsessional neurotic situates himself here - in the hainamoration supported by capital-T, i.e. in the hatred for existence and in the love for non-existence - at the joint of the imaginary and the real (R)11.
But on the other hand "to kick the bucket", to wish to get similar to death means here too: to go to sleep, to lapse into that sleep, that death which is not the real death, but "a dream amongst other dreams ... the dream to be in the mythic"12. For as the obsessional neurotic here dreams quite concretely about "leaving the university" (*Abgang), i.e. about a progress into another discourse, that he supposes to be as a discourse of the Other the discourse of the analyst, the matter here is - and that is the wish-fulfilment portrayed in this dream - to restore the rights of the body and of speaking, to achieve that this speaking - en-corps - continues to exist, that is that it should be. But insofar the death which is meant by the imaginary wish for death is the symbolic death (the small death); and insofar the obsessional neurotic is situated here - in the hainamoration supported by small-t, i.e. in the love for being and the hatred of non-existence - at the joint of the imaginary and the symbolic (S)13.
6. The challenge
But the obsessional neurotic is situated in spite of all that not - and that is decisive - at the joint of the real and the symbolic, that means he is not situated in the ignorance (non-knowledge)14. Or rather: he is situated in it, but neither does he know about it (because in that he lacks knowledge), nor wants he to know it (because in that he is ignorant). And if he wanted to know it, so only in such a way, that he tries to make the interminability of the discourse terminable (for him it's an only potential and by no means an actual interminability, in which the interminable analysis described by Freud has its legitimacy). He tries it in a way, which is at a structural level totally equivalent to the inner exclusion characteristic of him: to the inner limitation of life through death. For as for him, who is in analysis, life, at the basis of hainamoration, actually proves to be death and death to be the real life, so his knowledge about psychoanalysis, now facing the analyst, proves to be actually a lack of knowledge about himself and his lack of knowledge about himself a true knowledge about psychoanalysis.
In fact, scarcely had he gone into analysis, he made it too - as the universitary discourse before - to his both attractive and repulsive center. He gathered up everything he could know about it (the significant "psychoanalysis"), and, with the help of this knowledge, tried if not just to analyze, but at least to comprehend himself (the significant "me"). He expressed for example his surprise, how little dreamy and logical the dream he told about was, and how little it made the impression of strangeness and distortion. Or he interpreted philosophically the ambiguity of his dream formula of "leaving" (*Abgang) as the tension between concrete and abstract negation. Moreover, he believed to be able to explain his difficulties in writing his university papers through a reference to a passage in a text of Freud, quoted, by the way, precisely and bibliographically correct.
It is not the place to examine closer or to question the relevance of such references here, for in his lack of knowledge about himself, as already mentioned, he seemed to possess an unconscious knowledge about psychoanalysis, a knowledge about its lack of knowledge. But the effects of such a wish for comprehending and regulating became obvious to me: the obsessional neurotic becomes a hindrance to analysis not only because the "analytic basic rule" (free association) is a horror for him, but also - and first of all - because he is absolutely able to infect us analysts, who can`t totally delete the significant of knowledge too, with his will for knowledge and with his "knowledge-plague". For, as Lacan asserts, "thinking is lastly a being glued in ... something, that I had illuminated by what I call the imaginary and what was well noticed by a whole philosophical tradition"15. And so we, the analysts, who owe very much (possibly too much) to just this tradition16, won`t be able to escape totally the grip of the obsessional neurotic thinking, namely his thinking of thinking and his knowledge of knowledge.
And this holds to me, without wanting to dramatize things, the actual "danger" for the practice of psychoanalysis. This danger - to be "infected" by the obsessional neurotic, to be "glued in" by his thinking - seems to me as greater as less a double caution in this practice exists: on the one hand caution against the imaginary compulsion to explain scientifically, what it is about with a neurotic symptom (this compulsion, in psychoanalysis as such, is always possible), and on the other hand caution against the symbolic compulsion to institutionalize psychoanalysis, actually to give its knowledge a constitution (and this , in scientific psychoanalysis, is always necessary). Every time psychoanalysis neglects this caution - so my hypothesis - it can hardly cope with the challenge of the obsessional neurotics discourse (that actually should be just as much a challenge for psychoanalysis as vice versa), gives in so much to the obsessional discourse, that it supports the claimed progress into the discourse of the analyst as a mirror through a regress (to which it doesn`t pay sufficient attention) into the discourse of the university.
7. The withdrawal
Thus finally it became clear to me, that with all my interpretation attempts I was on the wrong way as closer I got to the center, not to say to the navel of his dream. While I was searching for a hidden system in his speaking and while I wanted to know, what it is about with this system, I was "glued in" by his thinking. This was nowhere more clear as with the attempt to analyze more precisely the end of his dream. Considerable resistances occured against this analysis: he couldn`t associate anything with the woman who he accompanied in his dream back into the flat and about whom he finally recognized, that she "only wanted to wrap me about the little finger, to butter me up". And as for that reason I asked him to report about all women he had got to know in the last years, he only affirmed again and again, that these acquaintances "are really not worth mentioning" and that they were only "very superficial".
But just this affectlessness and rationalizing tendencies which are to be seen again and again in case of strong repressions led to my inquiry; and in its course it turned out: With one of these women, who was similar to the woman in the dream, "not very pretty" and "already somewhat elder", he engaged not only into a short-term sexual relationship, she also fascinated him because of her close relationship to the analytic discourse. So he reported: "She was already more than ten years in analysis. She couldn`t think of anything else. When I met her, she permanently spoke about that, and if once she didn`t then she had to analyze her whole environment: friends, acquaintances, her husband and her son; all of them had some sort of neurosis: an obsessional neurosis, an anxiety neurosis, a hystery, a depression. To all she suggested therefore "to go into analysis". That annoyed me so much, that I broke off the contact to her after a few weeks."
But at this moment it became clear to me, that probably she was it who invited him to go into analysis and who gave him the idea to look me up. But if this was correct - and I hadn`t any doubt in spite of his missing confirmation -, it was not mistaken to suppose that the events in his dream were grouped around not only one but two centers, around the universitary discourse, represented here by the professor (as father), and around the analytic discourse, represented here by this woman (perhaps as mother) and that he not only fought out the same ambivalence conflict with both, but also tried to elude this conflict by a renewed questioning of the real through the imaginary, i.e. again a hatred-motion.
As soon as this reflectorical hatred asserted itself (reflectorical insofar as its "sujet" was the hainamoration), he obviously began to hysterize himself - but this is, however, only a hypothesis, which I couldn`t continue to observe because of the early end of the analysis. Just as before when he identified himself with the professor as his "doctor-father-God" and didn`t know whether he was dead or alive, now, when in his change from one to the other, from the progress into the analytic discourse to the regress into the universitary discourse and vice versa he identified both with the professor and this woman, he didn`t know whether he was a man or a woman17. That`s why in his dream he made a clear decision concerning the institutional impass into which both movements and identifications were leading him: basically, he said to himself, I can only withdraw from such an impass. That is, in face of the analytic discourse, he had to realize his leaving (*Abgang) as a hysterical leaving , which, in his dream and in face of the universitary discourse, he first imaginated as an imperious leaving.
What happened then was exactly this hysterical withdrawal from the supposed institutional analytic discourse. After showing himself "off" by means of an extremely confuse monologue, in which he gave vent to his jealousy of my analytic knowledge, he said good-by to me and never came back again.
8. The conclusion
In an attempt to summarize in a few words the experience related to the failure of the analysis, following has to be said:
First, the psychoanalytic discourse is obviously closer to the universitary discourse than it would like to be - this is shown by the easiness with which it can occasionally transform into the other18. Lacan has apparently seen this closeness, for he arranges the discourses he wrote up - the discourse of the master, of the hysterical, of the analyst and of the university - circularly (all four terms change their places); and nevertheless he divides this cycle into two half-circles: though the discourse of the master is illuminated by its regression into the discourse of the hysterical (first half-circle) and again the discourse of the university is illuminated by its progress into the discourse of the analyst (the second-half circle), neither exists a gradual transition from the discourse of the hysterical to the discourse of the analyst (neither regression nor progress) nor one from the discourse of the university to the discourse of the master. But nevertheless a sort of - possibly only temporary - withdrawal prevails here, which clinical description has yet to be made and which theorizing could contribute to the illumination of our experience.
Secondly, the universitary discourse is the center of the obsessional neurosis insofar, as it is always aimed at as a center to be left - as a center, in that both the attractive and repulsive, the centrifugal and the centripetal forces are in balance; but - of course - they may dissociate, namely when the hatred for existence as a love to non-existence ("supported by capital-T") reflects upon the existence of the love-hatred relationship itself, that is upon the whole discourse centered around the love-hatred relationship. In this case, I said, we have to do with a reflectorical hatred, which, if it cannot be coped with in the analytic discourse, motivates the withdrawal, - a withdrawal, that can be seen at the peremptory or hysterical manner of the patient and that leads the analysis regularly into a crisis.
And thirdly, the analytic discourse necessarily becomes the center of the obsessional neurosis too. In fact, it has to become this center as a center of hainamoration, if it wants to link back the unbridled hatred of the obsessional neurosis to the love for existence ("supported by small-t") in which more space should be given to the articulation of the body and to speaking. But just for this reason the analytic discourse (as the universitary discourse before) may become the primarily hated center ("supported by capital-T") of the neurosis too, especially when the analyst in his practice, confronted with the theoretical supposition of the patient that the analytic discourse has to be an institutional discourse, can`t oppose anything else but his knowledge to this supposition. For this knowledge is not any more only a supposition in the sense of the Lacanian triple "sujet-supposé-savoir"19; it is a specific quadriple form of this sujet, in which still another knowledge, the knowledge of the Other is supposed: the form of the "sujet-supposé-savoir du savoir".
1 This paper is the American translation of the expanded and completely revised version of my essay: Was das heißt: Hereingeleimtwerden. Bruchstücke einer Traumanalyse [What does that mean "to be glued in". Fragments of a dream-analysis], first published in Germany in: Diskurier, No.5, Karlsruhe 1994, p.79ff.
2 Cf. Jacques Lacan, L'Angoisse (Séminaire Livre X), Seminar 30.1.1963; cf. Jacques Lacan , L'Envers de la Psychanalyse (Séminaire Livre XVII), Paris 1991, p.171f.
3 Cf. Jacques Lacan, Encore (Séminaire Livre XX), Paris 1975, p.32.
4 "Am I alive or dead?" is the obsessional neurotic question corresponding to the explanation of Serge Leclaire in: La mort dans la vie de l'obsédé, in: La Psychanalyse 2 (1957), pp.129f.
5 Cf. Jacques Lacan, L'Envers de la Psychanalyse, op. cit., pp. 31, 43; Jacques Lacan, Encore, op. cit., p.21.
6 All explanations in brackets are supplements by the translator. Supplements with an asterix are quotations of the original german expressions.
7 For a complete interpretation see my paper: Von der Leimrute des Zwangsneurotikers. Eine Traumanalyse [About the lime-twig of the obsessional neurotic. A dream-interpretation], in: Psychoanalyse, Psychiatrie, Institution (Entwurf Bd.1), Frankfurt/M. 1995, p.37.
8 Cf. Jacques Lacan, Encore, op. cit., p.98.
9 In German the word "*Abgang" has several meanings. In this context it means the taste of wine at the palate when swallowing it - a technical term of wine-tasters. Another meaning of "*Abgang" is "leaving" - see e.g. "leaving the university" in this dream; and the meaning of "*den Abgang machen" is "to kick the bucket". All correspondences are nearly untranslatable.
10 Jacques Lacan, Das Begehren zu schlafen [The desire to sleep], in: Der Wunderblock, Nr.13, Berlin 1985, p.3 (cf. L'Ane, Le magazine freudien, Nr.3, Paris 1981, p.3).
11 Cf. Jacques Lacan, Les écrits techniques de Freud (Séminaire Livre I), Paris 1975, S.298f. 12 Jacques Lacan, Das Begehren zu schlafen [The desire to sleep], op. cit., p.3.
12 Jacques Lacaqn, Das Begehren zu schlafen [The desire to sleep], op. cit., p.3.
13 Cf. Jacques Lacan, Les écrits techniques de Freud, op. cit., p.298f.
14 Cf. Jacques Lacan, Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage, in: Jacques Lacan, Écrits, Paris 1966, p.309f.
15 Jacques Lacan, Vortrag in Genf über das Symptom[Genevian lecture about the symptom], in: Riss, Nr.1, Zürich 1986, p.9 (cf. Conférence à Geneve sur le symptome, in: Le Bloc-notes de la psychanalyse, Nr.5, Genf 1985, p.5ff)
16 Cf. Alain Juranville, Lacan et la philosophie, Paris 1984. 17 "Am I a man or a woman?" is the hysterical question corresponding to the explanation of Serge Leclaire, in: La mort dans la vie de l'obsédé, in: La Psychanalyse 2 (1957), p.129f.
17 "Am I a man or a woman?" is the hysterical question corresponding to the explanation of Serge Leclaire, in: La mort dans la vie de l'obsédé, op. cit., p.129f.
18 To prove this on a more implicit, i.e. conceptual and theoretical basis concerning the Lacan-interpretation of Alain Juranville refer to my paper: Psychoanalyse, Philosophie, Religion. Alain Juranvilles "dritter" Standpunkt [Psychoanalysis, philosophy, religion. Alain Juranvilles "third" position], in: Riss, Nr.37/38, Zürich 1997, p.75ff.
19 Cf. Jacques Lacan, Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'École, in: Scilicet I (1968), p.14ff.
* Christian Kupke is engaged in the relationship of psychoanalysis and philosophy for almost two decades. He has been co-founder of one of the first german avantgardistic literal magazines obliged to lacanian discourse called "Delta Tau. Zeitschrift f¸r Topologie und Str–mungskunde" (Berlin 1985ff). Later this magazine was transformed into "Der Entwurf. Schriftenreihe zur Psychoanalyse und ihrem Verh”ltnis zu Wissenschaft und Kunst" (1995ff), which again was and still is part of the "Edition Delta Tau", a collaboration with the Materialis Verlag residing in Frankfurt/M. He has also been the co-founder of the German interdisciplinary "Society for Philosophy and Sciences of Psyche" and is the co-editor of its two hitherto published annuals "Psyche im Streit der Theorien" (1996) and "Zeit und Zeitlichkeit" (2000). Christian Kupke now works as a writer, philosopher and text-consulter for several publishers and institutions in Berlin and Frankfurt/M., Germany and is currently working on a publication dealing with the relationship of semiotics, psychoanalysis and neuro-science. For more info refer to his webpage under http://www.compuserve.com/homepages/kupke.