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09/12/04 - The Iraqi Borrowed Kettle
05/21/04 - What Rumsfeld Doesn't Know That He Knows About Abu Ghraib
01/10/04 - Iraq's False Promises
11/04/03 - The Iraqi MacGuffin
09/25/03 - HEINER MUELLER OUT OF JOINT
04/14/03 - TOO MUCH DEMOCRACY?
03/13/03 - THE IRAQ WAR
- 09/25/2003 - HOMO SACER AS THE OBJECT OF THE DISCOURSE OF THE UNIVERSITY
by Slavoj Zizek
L'envers de la psychanalyse, Seminar XVII (1969-1970) on the four discourses, is Lacan's response to the events of 1968 - its premise is best captured as his reversal of the well-known anti-structuralist graffiti from the Paris walls of 1968 "Structures do not walk on the streets!" - if anything, this Seminar endeavors to demonstrate how structures DO walk on the streets, i.e. how structural shifts CAN account for the social outbursts like that of the 1968. Instead of the one symbolic Order with its set of a priori rules which guarantee social cohesion, we get the matrix of the passages from one to another discourse: Lacan's interest is focused on the passage from the discourse of the Master to the discourse of University as the hegemonic discourse in contemporary society. No wonder that the revolt was located at the universities: as such, it merely signaled the shift to the new forms of domination in which the scientific discourse serves legitimizes the relations of domination. Lacan's underlying premise is sceptic-conservative - Lacan's diagnosis is best captured by his famous retort to the student revolutionaries: "As hysterics, you demand a new master. You will get it!" This passage can also be conceived in more general terms, as the passage from the prerevolutionary ancien regime to the postrevolutionary new Master who does not want to admit that he is one, but proposes himself as a mere "servant" of the People in Nietzsche's terms, it is simply the passage from Master's ethics to slave morality, and this fact, perhaps, enables us a new approach to Nietzsche: when Nietzsche scornfully dismisses "slave morality," he is not attacking lower classes as such, but, rather, the new masters who are no longer ready to assume the title of the Master - "slave" is Nietzsche's term for a fake master. How, then, more closely, are we to read the university discourse?
In the University discourse, is not the upper level ($ a) that of biopolitics (in the sense deployed from Foucault to Agamben)? Of the expert knowledge dealing with its object which is a - not subjects, but individuals reduced to bare life? And does the lower not designate what Eric Santner called the "crisis of investiture," i.e., the impossibility of the subject to relate to S1, to identify with a Master-Signifier, to assume the imposed symbolic mandate?1 The key point is here that the expert rule of "biopolitics" is grounded in and conditioned by the crisis of investiture; this crisis generated the "post-metaphysical" survivalist stance of the Last Men, which ends up in an anemic spectacle of life dragging on as its own shadow. It is within this horizon that one should appreciate today's growing rejection of death penalty: what one should be able to discern is the hidden "biopolitics" which sustains this rejection. Those who assert the "sacredness of life," defending it against the threat of transcendent powers which parasitize on it, end up in a world in which, on behalf of its very official goal long pleasurable life all effective pleasures are prohibited or strictly controlled (smoking, drugs, food ). Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan is the latest example of this survivalist attitude towards dying, with its "demystifying" presentation of war as a meaningless slaughter which nothing can really justify - as such, it provides the best possible justification for the Colin Powell's "no-casualties-on-our-side" military doctrine.
On today's market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol... And the list goes on: what about virtual sex as sex without sex, the Colin Powell doctrine of warfare with no casualties (on our side, of course) as warfare without warfare, the contemporary redefinition of politics as the art of expert administration as politics without politics, up to today's tolerant liberal multiculturalism as an experience of Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized Other who dances fascinating dances and has an ecologically sound holistic approach to reality, while features like wife beating remain out of sight )? Virtual Reality simply generalizes this procedure of offering a product deprived of its substance: it provides reality itself deprived of its substance, of the resisting hard kernel of the Real - in the same way decaffeinated coffee smells and tastes like the real coffee without being the real one, Virtual Reality is experienced as reality without being one.
Is this not the attitude of the hedonistic Last Man? Everything is permitted, you can enjoy everything, BUT deprived of its substance which makes it dangerous. (This is also Last Man's revolution "revolution without revolution.") Is this not one of the two versions of Lacan's anti-Dostoyevski motto "If God doesn't exist, everything is prohibited"? (1) God is dead, we live in a permissive universe, you should strive for pleasures and happiness but, in order to have a life full of happiness and pleasures, you should avoid dangerous excesses, so everything is prohibited if it is not deprived of its substance; (2) If God is dead, superego enjoins you to enjoy, but every determinate enjoyment is already a betrayal of the unconditional one, so it should be prohibited. The nutritive version of this is to enjoy directly the Thing Itself: why bother with coffee? Inject caffeine directly into your blood! Why bother with sensual perceptions and excitations by external reality? Take drugs which directly affect your brain! - And if there is God, then everything is permitted to those who claim to act directly on behalf of God, as the instruments of His will; clearly, a direct link to God justifies our violation of any "merely human" constraints and considerations (as in Stalinism, where the reference to the big Other of historical Necessity justifies absolute ruthlessness).
Today's hedonism combines pleasure with constraint it is no longer the old notion of the "right measure" between pleasure and constraint, but a kind of pseudo-Hegelian immediate coincidence of the opposites: action and reaction should coincide, the very thing which causes damage should already be the medicine. The ultimate example of it is arguably a chocolate laxative, available in the US, with the paradoxical injunction "Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate!", i.e., of the very thing which causes constipation. Do we not find here a weird version of Wagner's famous "Only the spear which caused the wound can heal it" from Parsifal? And is not a negative proof of the hegemony of this stance the fact that true unconstrained consumption (in all its main forms: drugs, free sex, smoking ) is emerging as the main danger? The fight against these dangers is one of the main investments of today's "biopolitics." Solutions are here desperately sought which would reproduce the paradox of the chocolate laxative. The main contender is "safe sex" a term which makes one appreciative of the truth of the old saying "Is having sex with a condom not like taking a shower with a raincoat on?". The ultimate goal would be here, along the lines of decaf coffee, to invent "opium without opium": no wonder marijuana is so popular among liberals who want to legalize it it already IS a kind of "opium without opium."
The structure of the "chocolate laxative," of a product containing the agent of its own containment, can be discerned throughout today's ideological landscape. There are two topics which determine today's liberal tolerant attitude towards Others: the respect of Otherness, openness towards it, AND the obsessive fear of harassment in short, the Other is OK insofar as its presence is not intrusive, insofar as the Other is not really Other A similar structure is clearly present in how we relate to capitalist profiteering: it is OK IF it is counteracted with charitable activities first you amass billions, then you return (part of) them to the needy And the same goes for war, for the emergent logic of humanitarian or pacifist militarism: war is OK insofar as it really serves to bring about peace, democracy, or to create conditions for distributing humanitarian help. And does the same not hold more and more even for democracy: it is OK if it is "rethought" to include torture and a permanent emergency state, if it is cleansed of its populist "excesses," and if the people are "mature" enough to live by it
However, what we were describing what cannot but appear as two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to bare life, to homo sacer as the dispensable object of the expert caretaking knowledge; and that of the respect for the vulnerable Other brought to extreme, of the attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences itself as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential "harassments." Is there a stronger contrast than the one between the respect for the Other's vulnerability and the reduction of the Other to "mere life" regulated by the administrative knowledge?
But what if these two stances nonetheless rely on the same root, what if they are the two aspects of one and the same underlying attitude, what if they coincide in what one is tempted to designate as the contemporary case of the Hegelian "infinite judgement" which asserts the identity of opposites? What the two poles share is precisely the underlying refusal of any higher Causes, the notion that the ultimate goal of our lives is life itself. Nowhere is the complicity of these two levels clearer as in the case of the opposition to death penalty no wonder, since (violently putting another human being to) death is, quite logically, the ultimate traumatic point of biopolitics, the politics of the administration of life. To put it in Foucauldian terms, is the abolition of death penalty not part of a certain "biopolitics" which considers crime as the result of social, psychological, ideological, etc., circumstances: the notion of the morally/legally responsible subject is an ideological fiction whose function is to cover up the network of power relations, individuals are not responsible for the crimes they commit, so they should not be punished? Is, however, the obverse of this thesis not that those who control the circumstances control the people? No wonder the two strongest industrial complexes are today the military and the medical, that of destroying and that of prolonging life.
Superego is thus not directly S2; it is rather the S1 of the S2 itself, the dimension of an unconditional injunction that is inherent to knowledge itself. Recall the informations about health we are bombarded with all the time: "Smoking is dangerous! To much fat may cause a heart attack! Regular exercise leads to a longer life!" etc.etc. it is impossible not to hear beneath it the unconditional injunction "You should enjoy a long and healthy life!" What this means is that the discourse of the University is thoroughly mystifying, concealing its true foundation, obfuscating the unfreedom on which it relies.
1. See Eric Santner, My Own Private Germany, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996.
A stanza from a longer poem which, I think, describes the subjective experience Zizek is writing about at a macro level.
In the morning, after the breakfast things
Are cleared away, it seems a natural thought
To ask “What shall I do?”
But exposed as we are to conspiracy freaks
And their consulting talk show obsessives,
What is a natural thought to us
Is to them a question of damnation,
To be examined only with the guidance
Of their inner voices. For we live,
Say these voices, in two worlds at once,
And must learn to conduct ourselves in each
According to what is required.
For though, as they say, we find ourselves
At breakfast in the morning, we are
Simultaneously in the presence
Of their Lord Jehovah, who compels us
To act unthinkingly on His commands.
And our chief sin is feigning, or lack
Of sincerity, which causes night sweats,
And all the terrors of this world.
Roy Robbins <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Blacksburg, VA, - Friday, October 03, 2003 at 11:37:16 (EDT)
This quest for mastery drives the University to demand that the Object embody the idealised signifiers of the institution - the family, the church, the state - and all its values, The fantasy of the University Discourse is that this will induce a conformity and obliterate the possibility of a discordant discourse. What is produced instead, is an alienated subject. Contemplating the ‘Other’ as mere object in the University discourse, Verhaeghe states: The relationship between this object and the signifying chain is structurally an impossible one: the object is precisely that element, Das Ding, beyond the signifier...the signifying chain is the least appropriate agent for reaching it.
The University discourse is unique in that it has a peculiar relation with respect to lack. First, the sender’s speech is directed towards Object a as lack, which is beyond the signifier. Second, the product of this lack, produces a divided subject in a metonymical relation to surplus product, also lacking in signification. This lack of a lack can be read as the Lacanian definition of anxiety. More disturbing, this fullness, product as unary trait, upholds the master signifier which drives the University discourse to sustain the illusion of tyranny - the Master as complete. One can argue that the product is a divided subject, but its installation is perverse. It is spawned from an Other outside the signifying chain to embody a place of surplus enjoyment, I would argue that this Product is a semblance of perverse structure, alienated but not separated from the Other in language. As in perversity, it is the Other’s anxiety, that provides an opening, a fleeting death for the subject with the promise of release from th Other.
In Seminar XVIII Lacan posits: ‘The purpose of the University discourse is that everyone fulfils his function, so I also do mine - it also has its effects.’
Impossibility: It is structurally impossible for the Other, as Object, to engage with speech
Impotence: The product, alienated subject, bears no resemblance to the tyranny that drives the University discourse.
The social bond: The University discourse influences conformity. It affirms that the sexual relationship does exist. The State affirms this by upholding the family value, the Church by affirming the production of children. These tenets are sustained by the division between knowledge and truth and a destitute subject who knows neither. in the University discourse structure, the agent imagines that ‘the Other speaks my language.
The analytic process: To expose the master signifiers that underlie the university discourse and constitute its truth
Loretta Monaco <email@example.com>
London England - , - Wednesday, October 01, 2003 at 04:53:21 (EDT)
This article was contributed to lacan.com by Slavoj Zizek on 9/25/03
New York, - Tuesday, September 30, 2003 at 13:31:02 (EDT)